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Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate
discussions and critical comments. This is a revised version of the paper
originally written March 1992.
Research for this paper was partially funded by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
in Madrid.
I have benefited from conversations with Robert Barro, Paul Cashin, Larry Katz,
Elvinticinc Dedesembre, Fumfum Furn, Chris Sims, Etsuro Shioji, T.N.
Srinivasan and Joel Waldfogel.

Abstract
In this paper I develop a simple model of optimal criminal behavior to analyze

the role of public welfare policies such as redistributional transfers or wage subsidies.
I show that public welfare acts as a crime-preventing device since it increases the
opportunity cost of committing crimes.
I argue that transfers and wage subsidies can be thought of as productive
public goods subject to congestion, as with police protection and national defense.
Transfers and Wage subsidies are productive because they reduce the criminal-induced
aggregate distortions in the economy.

They are subject to congestion because when a

person decides to increase his output he also increases the average output in the
economy and, therefore, the reward to others of criminal actions.

Hence, he congests

the protective role of the public welfare system, for a given level of public welfare
payments.
I find the growth-maximizing size of the public welfare program and I show
that public welfare should be financed with income (not lump-sum) taxes, despite the
fact that income taxes are distortionary.

The reason is that income taxes act as a

user fee on congested public goods.
Finally, I show that, in a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation
between transfers and growth is significantly positive.
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A substantial fraction of the recent growth literature deals with the role of
government in the process of economic development.

Chamley (1981), Lucas (1990)

and the subsequent literature deal with the problem of optimal taxation.

Barro

(1990) developed a model where the productive aspects of public spending are offset
by distortionary taxes.

He also discusses the optimal size of the government.

A

number of papers have followed and extended Barro to include public investment,
public consumption and different types of other public goods and taxes.
Despite their large and growing size in almost all countries in the world, little
attention has been paid to the role of transfers and other forms of public

welfare.

In the United States for instance transfers in 1991 represented 12% of

GDP and accounted for 46% of spending by the federal government.

By comparison,

public investment (on which most of the theoretical attention has focused) represents
4% of GDP or 13% of federal spending and national defense is 5.6% of GDP and
21 % of federal spending.
In this paper I provide a rationale for the existence of public welfare programs
such as redistributional transfers or wage subsidies, 1 and their relation to economic
growth.

In the existing growth literature, transfers are often modeled as something

that enters the utility function of some planner, politician, or median voter (see for
instance Alesina and Rodrik (1992), Persson and Tabellini (1991), or Tabellini
(1992)), or as a resource which needs to be redistributed in a lump-sum fashion
among the population in order to be able to analyze the effect of a particular tax,
while keeping constant the overall size of the government (see for instance Blanchard
and Fischer (1991)).
The main point of this paper is that transfers are a means to buy social peace.

11 analyze old-age public pensions in Sala-i-Martin (1992).
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They are a way to bribe poor people out of activities that are socially harmful, such
as crimes, revolutions, inner-city riots 2 and other forms of social disruption.

In the

first section I present a model where people choose the amount of time they want to
devote to criminal activities.

The model is in the spirit of Becker (1968) and

Ehrlich (1970) but, unlike them, I do not try to determine what are the optimal
policies to combat illegal behavior (such as the optimal severity of punishment or the
optimal size of penalties for different types of crimes).

My goal is to show that

transfers and other forms of public welfare are devices that reduce the incentive to
commit crimes, because they increase the amount of income one can legally receive
outside jail.

I show that these results are robust to the inclusion of leisure, even

though economic intuition says that transfers unrelated to work effort could have a
perverse effect on criminal intensity.
One of the key results from the first section is that what matters for criminals
is the size of transfers or wage subsidies relative to the average level of income of
the economy.

Hence, in the aggregate economy, transfers look very much like a

public good subject to congestion:
average income of the economy.

when a person increases his income, so does the
This increases the reward to criminal behavior and,

with it, the protective role of transfers is congested.
The final section incorporates the analysis into an aggregate model of growth.
This allows me to determine the growth-maximizing amount of public welfare in the
economy as the government balances the beneficial, protective effects of transfers and
wage subsidies with the adverse effects of the distortionary taxes needed to finance
such programs.

I also show that the government can replicate the planner's solution

by using income taxes and not lump sum taxes.

The intuition is that income taxes

act like 'user fees' on the protective role of the public welfare policies.
2The 1992 Los Angeles riots occurred at exactly the time I was writing the first ·
draft of this paper.
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A Simple Model of Criminal Behavior.
The model I use to analyze transfers extends Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1970).
Let ti be the fraction of time an individual devotes to illegal, criminal or disruptive
activities such as thefts, robberies, strikes or revolutions. 3 After normalizing total
non-leisure disposable time to one, the time devoted to legal activities is 1-ti"

The

reward for devoting one unit of time to a legal activity (work) is the wage rate w.
The reward for engaging in criminal activity is fly per unit of time where y is the
average income of the economy and fl is a number between zero and one.

If we

argue that criminal activity is akin to mugging people on the street, and that the
average person carries a fraction fl of his income in his pocket4, then fl•y is the
reward per unit of time devoted to crime, and fl• y •ti is the reward for criminals who
choose to devote ti units of their time to this activity. I will assume that the only
purpose of crime is to obtain the monetary reward.

Unlike Becker (1968), agents in

my model do not engage in criminal activities simply because they like crime. 5
Utility is here solely a function of consumption.
Society, through its government, has access to some technology to capture and
3An important and interesting question is why are these activities
considered
crimes that need to be punished, as opposed to just other activities that need to be
priced by the market. In other words, a car theft as a transaction between owner
and thief. One could think that, instead of being punished, a thief should just pay a
price to the owner, just like any other type of transactions. Under this view, there
would be no distinction between criminal and non-criminal activities.
4This fraction fl could be thought of as being chosen by the average person
according to some money demand model that I do not need to specify here. It
should be noted that, when making this choice, this person will take into account
the probability of being mugged and will add it to the interest foregone by holding
cash. That is, the larger the number of criminals operating in a certain area, the
lower is likely to be the reward per unit of time devoted to crime since people living
or working in that area will be careful not to carry too much money in their
pockets.
5Becker uses this assumption to explain passion crimes and other crimes that
entail no direct monetary reward to criminals. Another unrealistic assumption is
that all persons in the economy have the same attitude or preference for crime.
Different people may perceive crime differently and these differences may be due to
educational background and/or religious beliefs.
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prosecute criminals.

I will assume that the probability of a criminal being caught

and convicted is

This probability should be an increasing function of the effort

1r.

the government puts into enforcing laws.

It could also be thought to be an

increasing function of the amount of crime committed by any given person.
first simple model, however, I will assume that

1r

In this

is independent of the amount of

crimes people choose to commit.a I will relax this assumption later on.

Stigler

(1970) shows that if law enforcement is costly, there is an optimal amount of
enforcement which may be lower than the maximum allowed by the current
technology.

Hence, the probability of capture need not be one, even though

achieving such probability may be technologically feasible.

We can simply think of

7r

as the probability of capture and conviction given by the existing technology and the
optimal level of public effort.
Individual's preferences can be represented by the following expected utility
function:

(1)

where cP is the level of consumption if he is caught and convicted (p stands for
'penalized') and cnp is the level of consumption if he is not penalized.
The level of income if he is not convicted is equal to legal work

6Qne could argue that there is learning by doing (or learning by offending):
people who commit few crimes are naive and are more likely to be caught.
Professional criminals, on the other hand, have more experience and know how evade
police more easily. Furthermore, full-time criminals may be able to bribe policemen
and judges in order to lower their probability of conviction. The offsetting force is
that the more crimes you commit, the more likely the police are to devote their
efforts to capture you in particular (while if you are a naive part-time criminal, the
police are likely to either ignore you or to spend little effort in trying to capture
you). In this simple model I will assume that these forces roughly offset one another
and that the probability of being convicted is independent of ti'
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income, w•(l-ti), plus the income he gets from his criminal activities, /J•y•tr
further assume that there is a public welfare system in the economy.

I will

Public welfare

could take the forms of either a lump-sum transfer T, or a subsidy on the wage, w.7
Given that the model is static in nature, all income is consumed so the level of
consumption if not convicted is

(2)

w•(l-t.)
1

+ /J•y•t.1 + T

If convicted, individuals must pay a monetary fee, F. 8 This fee is related to

the level of income.

This relation could reflect the wages foregone while serving time

in jail, or the reduction in lifetime income due to the stigma attached to convicted
criminals:

conviction may stigmatize offenders by demonstrating that they are

untrustworthy.

To the extent that jobs that require trust have better wages, the

loss of such jobs will be an additional reason why the fee is related to the level of
income.

Waldfogel (1992) quantifies the importance of this effect empirically.

I will

7This wage subsidy could take the form of minimum wage laws or the
prohibition of work by children (which entails the elimination of the lowest wage
jobs).
ssome crimes are penalized with physical or non-monetary fees: the death
penalty or cutting off the criminal's hands or ears are just two examples (since
human ears are not traded in normal markets, these fees should be considered
non-monetary). I will, however, abstract from these physical penalties in the present
analysis.
Unlike governments, religions try to deter crime by imposing huge
non-monetary, yet non-physical, penalties: some would send criminals to hell for
infinitely many periods while others threaten criminals with reincarnation into
mushrooms or pigs which, unlike cows, are really terrible things to be reincarnated
into.
Because these non-monetary fees are paid in future lives, religions need to
adopt escape clauses (often called repentment) since, in the absence of such clauses,
a person who has committed a crime will find it optimal to keep committing more
crimes (once you know you will go to hell or that you will be a pig in a future life,
the marginal penalty for committing additional crimes is zero). The problem with
allowing for easy repentment is that people may find it optimal to live a criminal
life and seek a pardon through last-minute repentment. An interesting calculation
would be to determine what is the optimal amount of repentment that should be
allowed by religions. I will not try to provide an answer it in this paper.
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assume that the fee is homogeneous of degree one in the amount of income one gets
if not convicted:

(3)

where the fraction of income lost if convicted is ,\ -f{ti), and f'{\) > 0, f{0)=0 and
f''{ti) > 0.

In the above, ,\ indicates the severity of the fee per unit of crime and

f{ti) relates the amount of crime to the severity of the penalty. 9 The assumption on
the concavity of the penalty is made to ensure that the second order conditions are
satisfied. to

{4)

Consumption if convicted is therefore

cP = w•{l-t.)
+ fi•y•t.I + T - F{.) =
I
= {1-U(ti))•[w•{l-ti) + fi•y•ti + T]

One feature of this analysis is that, since the probability of being caught is
independent of whether the person actually commits crimes or not, he will have to
pay the fee with probability

'If,

even if he sets ti=0 {in other words, people could be

9The question of the optimal size of the penalty is interesting and important.
For instance, should the penalty be larger than a market compensation to the
victim? That is, suppose that a thief steals a car and he is captured. Should he
just compensate the victim by the amount of money that the market says the car is
worth (as is the case in, for instance, automobile accidents)? Or should the penalty
be higher? It can be argued that the penalty should be higher than the market
value so as to deter this type of transaction. But then the question becomes, why
would we want to deter such transactions? One possible answer is that theft is not
a regular market transaction in that it involves an externality that is not reflected in
the market price of the object being stolen. One key difference between market
exchanges and theft is that one of the parties in the theft does not participate
voluntarily. But then again, this presumably also applies to automobile accidents. I
think that this is an important question that has not yet been resolved in· the
literature of law and economics. See Klevorick {1985) for a survey.
101n fact this could be relaxed and the fee could be allowed to be concave as
long as it is not too concave. The exact condition is f">-(fi-w)-f'•{l+w-)/[w-•cnp].
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erroneously prosecuted and convicted).

Since I am assuming that the fee people pay

when they commit no crimes is zero (as f{0)=0) and, in addition, they do not suffer
any disutility from being penalized, then whether innocent people are penalized or not
is irrelevant {ie cP(ti=O)=cnp(ti=O)).
probability model is the following:

Another way to think about the constant

every person faces a probability

investigated or searched by the police.

\f

of being

If searched, the police find out how much

crime that person has committed and, accordingly, he has to pay a fee.

If it turns

out that he did not commit any crimes, he pays nothing.
Individuals choose ti so as to maximize utility {1) subject to (2), {3) and (4).
The first-order
condition entails the equalization of the marginal utility of t.1 to zero.
.
This condition can be rewritten as:

(5)

If we assume that the maximum possible fee is all income {H(ti)<l), then the term

inside the squared brackets is positive.

Since the right hand side of (5) is positive,

people will devote positive amounts of effort to criminal activities only if /J>w/y.

In

other words, only if the reward to committing crimes is higher than the reward of
spending the same time in a legal activity will people commit crimes.

This of course

implies that only poor, low wage people will become criminals (rich people can earn
more money by working).11 The second order condition that ensures this is a
11This does not mean that poor people are inherently worse in any sense. I have
assumed that everybody has the same preferences towards crime and, therefore,
everybody is equally good. The implication of the model comes from the opportunity
set faced by both rich and poor. It is more profitable for the rich to be legal and
for the poor to be criminal.
Of course I have assumed that the only reward for criminal behavior is the
average level of income. It is entirely possible that rich people have access to a
better, more rewarding set of criminal activities {white collar crime). If I amended
the model to incorporate these factors, the implication would be that, given the size
of the criminal reward a particular person faces, he would choose to devote zero time
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maximum is

In Figure 1 I plot the marginal benefit MB (which corresponds to the left-hand
side of (5)) and marginal cost MC (which corresponds to the right-hand side of (5))
of criminal behavior.

Because the fee is convex, the marginal cost is upward sloping.

The marginal benefit is downward sloping. The optimal amount of criminal activity is
determined by the crossing of MB and MC.

If they cross at a point where ti is

between zero and one, the solution will be interior.
ti=l, individuals will become full-time criminals.

If they cross to the right of

If they cross to the left of ti=O,

individuals will devote all their time to legal activities.

The effects of growth on crime.
Imagine that the average income, the transfer received by potential criminals
and the wage rate all increase in the same proportion.
that the amount of crime remains unchanged.

The first-order condition says

In other words, in an economy where

the fines, wages and transfers are fully indexed, the amount of crime is invariant to
the level of income.

The reason is that the rewards and costs of engaging in

criminal behavior increase in the same proportion and, therefore, there is no
additional incentive or disincentive to perform such activities.
Non-fully-indexed penalty systems, on the other hand, will tend to generate
more crime as the economy grows since the rewards for committing crimes grow
faster than the penalties.

In terms of my analysis, this would correspond to a

steady decline of ,\ holding everything else constant (I will analyze this case later

to illegal activities if the wage rate he can earn in legal activities is higher.
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on). The model, therefore, has no direct prediction on the relation between the
amount of crime and the level of income of the economy.

Increase in Income Inequality.
The process of economic development is sometimes not homogeneous across
people: income inequality may increase or decrease as the economy develops.

Some

people argue that there is an inverse-U shape relation between income and inequality
(Kuznets curve).

We can analyze the effects of an increase in income inequality on

the optimal amount of crime.

In the present set-up this can be thought of as a

reduction in the wage rate, w, holding constant the average level of income y, or a
reduction in w/y.

The MB schedule in Figure 1 shifts up while MC shifts down.

The result is an increase in the optimal amount of crime.

This can be also seen by

applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order condition:

<0

(7)

The intuition is that an increase in income inequality reduces the benefits of working
in the legal sector, while keeping the gains from crime constant.
optimal reaction is an increase in crime.

The obvious

Hence, models that predict that economic

growth is associated with larger income inequality will also predict an increase in
disruptive activities.

Ehrlich (1973) provides evidence supporting this proposition.

Better Enforcement of Laws.
Consider now an increase in the probability of conviction.

This could be the

result of higher investment in police protection or an improvement in the technology
used by the police force.

In terms of Figure 1, the MC line shifts upward while MB
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remains unchanged.

The total amount of crime goes down.

The exact change is

given by

( en P / y ) • f ' •,\

(8)

< 0.

au/ atf
Again the intuition is straightforward:

a higher probability of being caught and

convicted lowers the expected rewards of criminal activity and, therefore, lowers the
number of crimes committed.

Larger Fees.
Imagine now that the authorities decide to increase the fees paid for every level
of crime.

This corresponds to an increase in ,\ in the model.

shifts down and MC shifts up.

The MB schedule

The result is a reduction in the amount of crime.

The quantitative change is given by

(9)

(fi-w / y ) f +

,r • cnp · f'

/ y

<

o.

a2u;t~1
When penalties for being convicted are high, crime is low.

Nore Transfers and/or wage subsidies.

Finally, consider the effect of an increase in transfers (while maintaining average
income constant).

Because of the linear homogeneity of the fee with respect to

income, the marginal benefit of committing crimes does not change.

The marginal

cost, on the other hand, increases as people who are convicted forego a larger
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amount of income.

The result is a reduction in crime:

(10)

Ot/O(T/y) -

Transfers in this model act just like fees since they increase the (opportunity)
cost of being penalized:

when convicted, people lose a fraction .H( ti) of their income.

Of course, the more they earn the more they lose if convicted. In other words,
transfers provide an incentive to stay away from criminal activities by increasing the
level of income outside jail.

Hence, governments may want to use transfers as a

mechanism to bribe people out of crime:

when transfers are high, crime does not

pay.

Note that this result depends on an increase in transfers relative to income.

A

certain amount of transfers protect the population against crime, given the amount of
income.

Income is the prize that criminals obtain by committing crimes.

Holding

constant the 'degree of protection' (transfers), an increase in the prize (income)
induces people to commit more crimes.
Using cross-country data for 40 developed and developing economies, Tabellini
(1992) finds that the level of transfers per unit of GDP is positively related to the
pre-tax level of income inequality, even after he holds constant the initial level of
income and the ratio of elderly to total population (both variables are significantly
positively related to the level of transfers).
explanation for this finding.

He provides a political economy

The theory outlined in this paper, however, is also

consistent with these correlations: income inequality leads to high levels of crime
and, therefore, to the need for public welfare protection.
A natural question to ask is why and when would governments go to the
trouble of establishing a tax/transfer system instead of just increasing penalties, given
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that transfers act just like penalties or fees?

To answer this question we must bear

in mind that there are limits to the fees that governments can impose on people.

In

particular, people cannot pay more than everything they own.12 Suppose that the
penalty system is such that the fees paid if caught being a full-time criminal (ti=l)
are everything.13

Consider that group of people (desperate people) whose wage rate

relative to the average is so low that, despite these enormous fees, they decide to
become full time criminals (so they pay everything if caught).

An increase in fees

will not induce these desperate people out of criminal behavior because they will
already lose everything if convicted.

Hence, once people are in such a desperate

situation, fees are irrelevant in the sense that higher fees will not decrease criminal
behavior.

Transfers, on the other hand, will still work as an incentive device to

reduce crime because they are not a direct cost but rather an opportunity cost to
committing crimes:

by increasing the amount of income people receive if they stay

out of jail, transfers increase the size of 'everything' to criminals.

Hence, they still

increase the penalty and, therefore, they still reduce the optimal amount of crime.
Note that, in this model where there is no leisure choice, wage subsidies work
in much the same way that transfers do.
to y.

A wage subsidy would increase w relative

We already established that an increase in w/y reduces crime.

transfers, wage subsidies work as a crime-reduction device.

Thus, like

Note that, also like

12Here is where the assumption that governments cannot impose non-monetary
penalties like death or cutting off people's ears becomes relevant. Presumably the
value of lives and ears in terms of income is large enough so that crime can be
deterred with the use of these non-monetary penalties only. Countries that have
access to these types of drastic penalties (and some Muslim countries do) will not
need to use transfers to reduce disruptive behavior. In this paper I will not try to
explain why governments do not impose such big non-monetary penalties for
seemingly small crimes.
13People cannot lose exactly everything when they go to jail: the government
must provide some level of consumption while in jail. If this was not the case,
prisoners would starve to death. This would represent a non-monetary penalty which
I assumed was not allowed in this economy. This sentence should therefore say that
they lose 'almost' everything.
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transfers, what matters is the wage rate relative to the average level of income in
the economy.

As we saw above, if wages and income increase in the same

proportion (along with transfers and fees) the total amount of crime will remain
unchanged.
An additional point is that, when people find it optimal to commit crimes
under a certain economic environment, it is likely that they will still find it optimal
to commit crimes after serving time in jail unless the economic environment has
changed.

Transfer programs and public subsidies may be a way to change this

adverse economic environment.14

Making the Probability of Conviction a Function of Crime.
Up to now I have assumed that every person was investigated by the police
with the same probability
crime committed.

1r.

This probability was independent of the amount of

It is natural to assume that the probability of capture and

conviction is increasing in the amount of crime a person decides to commit:

in the

real world, the probability of non-criminals being arrested by mistake is not zero but
it is surely smaller than the probability faced by true criminals.
used to say:

As my grandmother

'when you are playing with fire, ... you are going to get burnt'.

Following my grandmother's infinite wisdom, I now will assume that

1r

is an

increasing function of ti with 1r'(ti)>0, 1r 11 (ti)<0 and 1r(0)=0. Individuals still
maximize (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4), taking into account that their actions will

14This assumes that people don't learn anything new in jail. It could be the
case that criminals did not really know what jail was all about and that an initial
period of incarceration shows them how terrible it is. This would increase the
perceived penalty and, therefore, reduce the amount of crime in the future. One
argument against this is that a lot of criminals come from families and neighborhoods
where crimes and criminals are abundant. Hence, it is likely that these people have
a pretty good idea of what it is to be in jail so their propensity to commit crimes
will not change after having been in jail once before. (see Sah (1991) or evidence on
this type of social osmosis).
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affect the probability of being caught:

{5)' (P-(w/y))· [1-A•f(ti)] - r•A• [(w/y)•{1-ti)+Pti+(T/y)]f'(ti) - r'(ti)•ln{1-Af{ti))·{1-Af{ti))· [(w/y)•{1-ti)+Pti+(T/y)] = 0.
The first two terms are the same as in (5).

They represent what would be

optimal if the probability of capture was unaffected by the choice of ti"

The third

term reflects the marginal losses in utility due to the increase in the probability of
capture when people decide to devote one more unit of time to illegal activities.
Note that this first-order condition is still invariant to the level of income if the
wage rate and the transfer system are fully indexed (that is, if w/y and T/y are
constant).

Hence, growth that preserves income inequality still does not have an

effect on the level of crime.

Using the implicit function theorem, we can see that

crime is still increasing in income inequality and decreasing in the size of the
penalties.

The effect of transfers on crime, on the other hand, is now the following:

{10)'

where

tPu/ Dt~

is negative according to the second-order conditions (which are

satisfied if ;r">O or if r" is not too negative).

The numerator of {10)' is positive:

the first term is the product of three positive numbers.
negative of a product of positive numbers times ln{l-H).

The second term is the
Since both A and f{ti) are

positive fractions, the number inside the logarithm is less than one and, therefore,
the logarithm is negative.

Therefore, T/y still acts as a crime-reducing device.

The main lesson is that if we allow the probability of capture and conviction to
be an increasing function of the amount of crime committed, the relevant features of

- 15 -

the model do not change.

In particular, transfers are still an opportunity cost of

being penalized and, therefore, they act as a crime-preventing device.

A Xodel Yith Leisure Choice.
The simple model used up to now treats wage subsidies and transfers in a very
symmetric way.
leisure optimally.

The reason is that agents were not allowed to choose the amount of
One could argue that if the choice of leisure is allowed, then a

transfer induces people to want to buy more leisure.

Of course they do so by

reducing the time spent in the activity with the lowest reward:

legal work.

Wage

subsidies (which you can collect only if you work), have an offsetting substitution
effect as the relative reward of legal work.

Transfers that are not linked to work,

however, do not have the substitution effect while they still have the perverse wealth
effect.

To investigate whether this perverse effect is possible in my model, let me

amend the utility function so as to incorporate a preference for leisure:

where ¢ is some discount rate on leisure, 1P is the amount of leisure the agent enjoys
if penalized and lnp is the leisure the agent enjoys if not penalized.

The time spent

working is (l-t.-1),
where t.1 is still the time devoted to crime (because total time
1
available is still normalized to 1).

As in the previous section we define cnp and cP

as follows:

(2)'

cnp = w•(1-t.-l) + P·y•t. + T
1
1

(4)'

cP = [1-Af(ti)]•cnp_

I will assume that part of the penalty for criminal behavior is in terms of lost
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utility.

If we denote the amount of leisure enjoyed when not penalized by 1 (so

lnp=l), the leisure enjoyed when penalized is:15

(11)

Agents choose 1 and ti so as to maximize utility subject to the constraints (2)',
(3)', and (11).

The first-order conditions entail

(12)

where 1* is the optimum amount of leisure given by

(14)

The derivative of 1* with respect to the transfer per unit of income is positive

(15)

a1*/8(T/y)

=

_!_,(y/w) > 0.
1+¢

Other things being equal, more transfers lead people to enjoy more leisure.

Using

(15), we can now calculate the effect of an increase in transfers per unit of income

1swe could also assume that the fraction of income lost if convicted is different
from the fraction of time lost if convicted. The reader can check that the key
results remain the same.

- 17 -

on crime
(lB)

*
Oti/O(T/y) = (1+¢)Jrl'[1-(w/y)-Ol /O(T/y)] =
2
D u/Ot~1
2

= A•:r•f'/[d u] < 0,
where d2u:-(l+:r)U'(,8-(w/y))-(1+¢)Jrl''cnp/y <0.

The first term inside the squared

brackets reflects the negative effect of transfers on crime that we outlined in previous
sections. The second term inside the brackets (w/y)•{)l*/O(T/y) reflects the perverse
wealth effect that transfers have on the consumption of leisure and, as a result, on
crime.

Under my particular specification, the overall effect of transfers on crime is

unambiguously negative.

That is, the perverse wealth effect never dominates.

This

result does not depend on the log utility specification (the overall effect with a
utility function of the form c1- 0/(1-0) and 11- 0/(1-0) yields:

Oti/O(T/y)= _ _ _
[{_:r_(1_-J_f_)1_-_0+_(1_-_:r)_}w_]_1J_0_ _:r_Jf_'_

which is still negative.
The effect of wage subsidies on crime, on the other hand, involves no
potentially perverse effects.

The reason is that, unlike transfers, wage subsidies have

a negative effect on leisure:

public transfers in the form of wages, increase the

reward to legal activities.

The substitution effect induces an increase in work effort

and a reduction in crime and leisure.

The wealth effect involve an increase in

leisure and a reduction in crime and work.

The overall effect is a reduction in
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leisure.

The overall effect on crime is given by

=

(1-Af)(w/y)+(1+¢)Arl'[(1-ti-l *)-{01 */O(w/y)}(w/y)] < 0,
2

0 u/Ot~

where

·" [(/Jt.+T/y)/('w/y) 2 ]<0. Note that all the terms in the
01 */O(w/y)=-_'I'_
1+¢
1

numerator of (17) are positive while the denominator is negative.

Hence, there is no

perverse wealth effect from wage subsidies.16
The lesson from this section is that, even though we could think that transfers
that are not linked to work may have a perverse effect on criminal behavior due to
a wealth effect on leisure, the overall effect is still negative.

However, the

quantitative effects of wage subsidies on crime are likely to be much larger than
those of transfers.

The main result is still that public welfare should have a

negative impact on the amount of time people devote to criminal activities and that
the relevant variable is the total spending on public welfare as a ratio to the average
income of the economy (which is, in turn, related to the average prize of criminal
behavior).

16Jn a general equilibrium model, wage subsidies may have another perverse effect
on crime, as they tend to generate unemployment. Note that this is not the case for
transfers.
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Public Welfare, Taxes, and Growth.
In the previous sections I considered the partial equilibrium effects of aggregate
public welfare policies on the criminal behavior of people.

The natural question to

ask is, given that the government can reduce crime by increasing the size of the
public welfare system, why doesn't it get rid of all crime by having an enormous
public welfare program?.

The answer is, of course, that transfers and subsidies need

to be financed by raising taxes.

Taxes, in turn, may distort private choices for

savings and investment which, in turn, affect the consumption path.

The

government, therefore, will have to balance the distortionary effects of the implicit
'taxes' imposed by criminals with those of the explicit taxes imposed by the
government itself.

In this section I use a simple model of growth in order to

analyze these issues.
Agents maximize a utility function of the form

Iil

e-pt

JO

(18)

C 1-0-1
---.,,....- dt,
1-0

where c is the average consumption of the population.
about (18).

There are two ways to think

First we could think that the representative agent does not care about

the utility of criminals.

Under this interpretation, c is the average consumption of

the non-criminal population.

Alternatively, we would think in terms of the veil of

ignorance of Harsany and Rawls where, ex-ante, people do not know whether they
will end up being criminals or not.

If we assume that, ex-ante, all agents are

identical, the choice variable c could be interpreted as the level of consumption of
the representative or average agent, and (18) then represents his utility.
I will imagine that, as a result of criminal and disruptive activities, some
aggregate output is lost.

Since most crimes entail just a transfer from victim to
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criminal (at least this is true for most property crimes) one could think that no
aggregate output is lost as a result.
losses may exist.

There are several reasons, however, why output

First, society may not care about the happiness of criminals.

If

this is the case, any resources that end up in their hands should be considered social
losses.

Second, victims of crime may be emotionally and physically disrupted.

The

consequence of such disruption will be a reduction in the victim's ability to perform
his job at pre-crime levels.

Crime, therefore, lowers labor productivity.

Third,

private individuals may devote effort, time, and resources to protect themselves
against crime.

This is a social waste much in the same manner as rent-seeking

activities that use up some output for no particularly useful purpose.

Fourth, some

output may be simply destroyed as a result of criminal activities: at the very least,
robbers are careless and they break precious pieces of china when they enter
somebody's house.

The worst possible scenario is of course the loss of life as a

consequence of a simple robbery (of course widespread fires and destruction are
intermediate cases of loss of GDP).
A fraction 1-~( •) of income is lost and a fraction ~( •) is still available after
crime.

We can also think of ~( •) as the instantaneous probability of maintaining

one's property rights on output.

According to the analysis above, this fraction or

probability will be an increasing function of the overall level of police and legal
protection, an increasing function of the size of the penalties for conviction, and a
decreasing function of income inequality.

Most importantly, it will be an increasing

function of the total amount of aggregate transfers or public welfare, TR, per unit of
average income.17 Since I assume that the population is constant, I can normalize
the stock of people to one so average and aggregate income coincide.

In order to

17We should think of TR as including not only transfers but also wage subsidies
and other kind of public welfare. As we showed in previous sections, all of them
affect crime negatively. In the rest of the paper, I use the terms transfers and
public welfare interchangeably.
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concentrate on the effects of transfers on growth, let me assume that the fraction

1/J

is solely a function of TR/Yac, where yac is 'after-crime' national income.is In
particular, I neglect police protection and public investment in property rights and
law enforcement, despite the fact that these are expenditures relevant to criminal
activities.

Hence, I assume

where the assumption on the last inequality is made so as to ensure that the
problem of crime is important enough to warrant public intervention.
Under this specification, redistributional transfers and public welfare resemble
productive public goods subject to congestion:

the amount of income people get to

keep after crime depends on the level of public welfare relative to the size of
criminal threat.

This threat, in turn, depends on the prize that criminals get if they

decide to commit crimes, which is proportional to national income.

When a person

increases his economic activity, he raises the economy's average level of income and,
with it, it congests the protective power of public welfare (Thompson (1974) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) interpret national defense spending along similar
lines).
I will imagine that the production function is linear in the capital stock

(20)

where ypc is per capita "pre-crime" income and k per capita capital.

The linearity

1BAlternatively, it could be assumed that I/JO is a function of TR per unit if
pre-crime income. This alternative specification does not change any of the
substantive results.
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of the production function is not essential to my analysis but it enables me to get
closed form solutions for growth rates {I could use a neoclassical production function
and the growth effects of different policies would be temporary and analytically
intractable; the direction of the growth effects along the transitional path would,
however, be the same).
The government collects revenue from a constant tax rate on after-crime
income r {I assume that illegal income does not pay taxes) and always runs a
balanced budget.

All components of public spending other than transfers are

excluded from the present analysis.
welfare.

All public revenue is therefore spent on public

The government budget constraint is:

{21)

where K is the aggregate capital stock and yac
income.

=

~(•)AK is after-crime aggregate

After-tax output is devoted to either consumption or investment.

The

constraint faced by the individual is, therefore

{22)

where k0>0 is given, r is the tax rate on 'after-crime' output, and o is the constant
rate of capital depreciation. Individuals maximize {18) subject to {22). Since all
agents are small relative to the aggregate, they all think that their actions do not
affect the behavior of the government.

Hence, when they optimize they take
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f(TR/rc) and r as given.19 The first-order conditions are

(23)

·
ac
7c = c/c = [(1-r)•f(TR/Y )·A· - p - 6]/0
lim p•k

=0

t-tw

where p is the shadow price associated with the constraint (22).

Note that, since r

is constant, the government budget constraint says that TR/Yac is also constant so
transfers and output grow at the same rate.
constant rate at all points in time.

It follows that consumption grows at a

From the budget constraint (22), it can be seen

that in the steady state, consumption, physical capital and, therefore, output grow at
the same rate rc=rk=ry=rTR=7•

The transversality conditions imply that physical

capital grows at that same rate at all points in time.

Hence, the model displays no

transitional dynamics as all variables grow at the same constant rate all the time.
We can use (23) to find the growth rate of the economy 20

(24)

7 = [(1-r)·A•f(r) - p - 6]/0.

The size of the public welfare program has two effects on the growth rate 7: on the
one hand higher taxes reduce growth as they distort investment decisions (this is the
term (1-r) in (24)); on the other hand they increase growth as they reduce the
191 assume that individuals, who own the firms, produce output at home. The
results would be the same if there were competitive markets for goods and capital.
20lf we assume that f() is a function of TR/Y rather than TR/Y, the growth
rate is not a function of f( r) but, instead, a function of 11( r) with 11'( r). Where 11()
canbe derived as follows: define f () as the function that satisfies the public budget
2
constraint p2(TR/AK) = r where p ()>0 (this follows from the assumptions p"<0
2
and f(0)~0). Invert it and plug in f(TR/ AK) to get the growth rate as a function
of r only where 11(r) = f(f 1{r)). Since both fO and fi) are monotonically
increasing, 11'(r)>O.

2
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amount of crime and disruption in the economy {this is the term ~( r) in {24)).
high levels of r {large governments) the first, detrimental effect dominates.

For

For low

levels of r the second, beneficial effect dominates because ~{0)<f{0) (see {19)).

In

words, if the crime problem when there is no public welfare is important enough,
then an increase in the size of such public programs will increase the growth rate of
the economy.

If this condition does not hold (so the crime problem is not

important), then it could be the case that lh/Dr<O for all r so the optimal size of
*
the government is r =0. Under these circumstances, there is a size of the
government r * at which the two effects exactly cancel out and growth reaches its
maximum. The rate r * is given by the following implicit function

The maximization of growth is not always equivalent to the maximization of
the utility of the representative agent.

This is true, however, when ~( •) takes a

Cobb Douglas form.

Superiority of Income Taxes.
It is interesting to compare the outcome of this market economy with that of a
planner.

Given an arbitrary size of the government, s=TR/[AK •~{TR/AK)], the

planner chooses

a path of consumption and capital so as to maximize the utility of

the representative consumer.

{26)

The resulting growth rate is

'Ypt -

[{1-s)•A·~(s) - p - 8]/0
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where the effect of s on the rate of growth is given by the following expression

(27)

Note that if a government using income taxes chooses r so as to maximize
growth ( r=r *=s *), then the social optimum will be replicated.

In other words, if

the size of the government is optimal, the proportional income tax is Pareto efficient.
It is interesting to see that a shift from income tax to lump-sum tax lowers utility
but it increases growth.

The growth rate under lump-sum taxes is given by:

(28)

Given the size of the government,· the growth rate corresponding to lump-sum taxes
is always larger than the one the planner would choose.
sum there is overinvestment and excessive growth.

That is, if taxes are lump

The intuition for this result is

that, when an individual producer decides to increase capital by one unit, he
increases the average output of the economy.

This in turn induces criminals to

increase their criminal effort since the rewards for crime have increased.

In other

words, investors congest the protective role of transfers without really taking this into
consideration when making investment decisions.
and overcrowd transfers.
congestion effect.

Therefore, they tend to overinvest

A lump-sum tax will not do anything to solve this

An income tax, on the other hand, acts as a fee for the use of

transfers as a crime-preventing device:
people from investing too much.
superior to a lump-sum tax.

it internalizes the externality and deters

Thus, from a social point of view, an income tax is
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Empirical Evidence Using Cross-Country Data.
Let me finish by providing some empirical evidence in favor of the theory
developed in this paper.

The key difference between my model and all other models

of transfers is that mine suggests that, because they are 'productive', transfers should
affect growth positively.

We can check these predictions using cross-country data:

IMF's Government Financial Statistics provide data on government transfers for a
sample of 75 countries going back to 1970. 21 I use the ratio of transfers to GDP,
along with the growth rates in real per-capita income between 1970 and 1985 from
the Summers and Heston data set.

I also use the 1970 ratio of public consumption

and public investment to GDP and the savings rate constructed by Barro (1991).
The model predicts that, in a cross-country regression, the growth rate of the
economy should be positively related to the size of the transfer program, once the
size of the government (which in the model is reflected by r) and proxies for the
preference parameters are held constant.

This prediction is checked in the first

column of Table 1. I proxy the preferences towards savings with the initial (1970)
savings rate and the size of the government with the 1970 ratio of total spending to
GDP.

Initial income is included so as to allow for the possibility of transitional

dynamics (recall that I assumed an Ak technology for simplicity but if, instead, the
technology is neoclassical, the growth implications of the model are the same for a
transitional period.

This transition is reflected in the initial level of income).

The

coefficient is negative and significant (-.0128 s.e.=0043), which reflects the importance
of the transitional process.

The key coefficients, however, are the ones on the size of

21The GFS transfer variable also includes old-age pensions. In Sala-i-Martin
{1992), I show that old-age pensions should ALSO be regarded as productive as they
induce unproductive, old people out of their jobs. Hence, I am not too worried
about the fact that this may be too broad a measure of transfers. Nevertheless, I
think it would be interesting to distinguish empirically which one of the two
components of total transfers dominates the results. For most poor countries of this
sample, however, separate data on redistributional and intergenerational transfers is
not available.

- 27 -

the government, -.1117 (s.e.=.0370) and the transfer to GDP ratio .1092 (s.e.=.0509).
As expected, holding the overall size of the government, transfers are positively
related to per-capita growth.
TR/Y instead of the level.

I repeat the experiment in column 2, using the log of
The overall results are the same (the coefficient on

log(TR/Y) is .0050 (s.e.=.0018)).
In the model outlined above, I neglected public investment, public consumption
and other forms of public spending.
such variables in the model.

Following Barro {1990), we could easily include

As in Barro (1990), the additional predictions would be

that productive spending (such as public investment) should be positively related to
growth, while non-productive spending (such as public consumption) should affect
growth negatively.
components:
(TR/Y).

In column 3, I break the total size of the government into three

public consumption (GC/Y), public investment (GI/Y) and transfers

Public consumption enters negatively (-.1285, s.e.=.0475) and public

investment is insignificant (-.2278, s.e.=1728).

The only variable that is positively

related to growth is transfers, with a coefficient of .1108 (s.e.=.0522).
These results suggest that, contrary to the predictions of ALL other theories,
transfers are positively related to growth rates for a large cross-section of countries.
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Conclusions.
In this paper I presented a model that explains the existence of redistributional
transfers.

I showed that such transfers are a mechanism to buy poor people out of

disruptive activities such as crime, revolutions or week-long inner city riots.

I

argued that public welfare is likely to have some effect on crime, especially among
those segments of the population that are so poor that the losses of going to jail are
very small relative to the potential gains from criminal behavior.

I also argued that,

in aggregate production functions, transfers and other forms of welfare look like
productive public inputs subject to congestion which increase the productivity of
private capital and, therefore, increase the growth rate of the economy.
derived the growth-maximizing size of the public welfare system.

I then

I showed that, as

a result of transfers being 'subject to congestion', an income tax system was superior
to a lump-sum tax system.

The reason was that income taxes act as user fees on

the use of welfare as a protective device.
in favor of the model:

Finally, I provided international evidence

contrary to the predictions of all other theories of transfers,

the data suggest that other things equal, countries that have larger transfers
programs tend to grow faster.22

22Using panel data for a sample of 23 OECD countries, Cashin {1992) also finds
a positive partial relation between the size of the transfer program and the rate of
growth.
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Table 1:

Growth and Transfers

(1)

(2)

(3)

GR7085

GR7085

GR7085

Constant

.0007
(.0099)

.0251
(.0138)

.0002
(.0111)

ln(GDP70)

-.0128
(.0043)

-.0133
(.0037)

-.0147
(.0049)

T

-.1117
(.0370)

-.1093
(.0356)

Savings Rate

.2006
(.0357)

.1997
(.0373)

TR/Y

.1092
(.0509)

.2168
(.0515)
.1108
(.0522)

.0050
(.0018)

log(TR/Y)

GC/Y

-.1285
(.0475)

GI/Y

-.2278
(.1728)

.35
.0183

.37
.0179

.35
.0182

Notes: Standard Errors are in parenthesis. All regressions have been estimated
using White's heteroscedasticity--consistent covariance matrix. The data for GDP and
growth rates is from Summers and Heston (1988). GR7085 is the annualized growth
rate of per capita GDP. ln(GDP70) is the logarithm of the 1970 per capita GDP.
r is a measure of the 1970 ratio of total government spending to GDP and is taken
from Barro (1991). The savings rate is the 1970 ratio of total investment to GDP.
R/Y is the average of the ratio of social security transfers to GDP for the ~eriod
1970-1985. GC/Y and GI/Y is the ratio of total government consumption excluding
defense and education) and total investment to GDP for 1970. They are ta en from
Barro (1991). Sample size: 75 countries.
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